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ABSTRACT 
The present article has as proposal the discussion of the philosophical categories of Idealism and 
Materialism in the Geographical thought. Starting from the assumption that the knowledge is a fact, 
we explicit our onto-epistemological basis by a dialog between the main representatives of each 
Philosophy pole, from Democritus to Hegel, exposing after the sublation to the metaphysics done 
by the dialectical materialism. Using a bridge to the hard core of the Critical Geography (Lefebvre, 
Harvey and Quaini), we transmute the philosophical debate to the geographical field showing the 
often ignored roots, logic and addictions of the Modern Geography. Retaking in the end the duel 
between Idealism and Materialism, we present our thesis in which the Crisis of Geography is, in fact, 
just the result of a process originated from its incapacity as a discipline to overcome the limiter vestige 
of its birth: the Metaphysics. 
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RESUMO 
O presente artigo tem como proposta a discussão das categorias filosóficas de idealismo e materialismo 
no pensamento Geográfico. Partindo do pressuposto de que o conhecimento é um fato, 
explicitamos a nossa base onto-epistemológica por meio de um diálogo entre os principais 
representantes de cada polo da Filosofia, de Demócrito à Hegel, expondo logo após a suprassunção 
à metafísica realizada pelo materialismo dialético. Pela ponte com o núcleo duro da Geografia 
Crítica (Lefebvre, Harvey e Quaini), transmutamos o debate filosófico para o campo geográfico ao 
mostrar as tão ignoradas raízes, lógica e vícios da Geografia Moderna. Retomando ao fim o duelo 
entre idealismo e materialismo, apresentamos nossa tese de que a Crise da Geografia é, na verdade, 
apenas o resultado de um processo oriundo de sua incapacidade como disciplina de superar o resquício 
limitador de seu berço: a Metafísica. 
 
Palavras-chave: Filosofia da Geografia; Lefebvre; Materialismo Dialético; Crise da Geografia. 
 
RESUMEN
                                                 
Article originally published in Portuguese in InterEspaço: Revista de Geografia e Interdisciplinaridade, v. 3, 
n. 8, jan./abr. 2017 <http://www.periodicoseletronicos.ufma.br/index.php/interespaco/article/view/6431>. 
|Materialism, idealism and the onto-epistemological roots of Geography| 
 
|Mikhael Lemos Paiva| 
 InterEspaço         Grajaú/MA        v. 3, n. 9        p. 07-26        maio/ago. 2017 
 
Página 8 
En este artículo se propone la discusión de las categorías filosóficas del idealismo y el materialismo 
en el pensamiento geográfico. En la hipótesis de que el conocimiento es un hecho, aclaramos 
nuestra base ontológica y epistemológica por medio de un diálogo entre los principales 
representantes de cada polo de la filosofía, Demócrito hasta Hegel, lo que sigue la supresión hacia la 
metafísica realizada por el materialismo dialéctico. Considerando los autores claves en la Geografía 
Crítica (Lefebvre, Harvey e Quaini), ubicamos el debate filosófico hacia el campo geográfico para 
indicar las raíces, por supuesto ignoradas, la lógica y los vicios de la Moderna Geografía. Pronto la 
retomada en el fin del artículo entre idealismo y materialismo, enseñaremos nuestra tesis de que la 
crisis de la Geografía es, en verdad, solamente el resultado de un proceso oriundo de su 
incapacidad, cómo disciplina, en superar el vestigio limitador de su cuna: la Metafísica.  
 





 The dispute between Idealism and Materialism is one of the most fascinating of 
Philosophy. Permeating it since its origin, the Idealism-Materialism dichotomy is present in 
any at attempt by Man to interpret Reality, be it in the field of Ontology, or in the 
subsequent Epistemology. Historically situated, the struggle between Being and Thought 
followed proportional intensity to the gradual rise of Modern Science, reaching its 
paroxysm with Hegel, Feuerbach, Marx and Engels, in the late Enlightenment of the 
Second Industrial Revolution. Although the debate is still present to this date, it‟s a fact 
that both the artificial rupture between Philosophy and Science- initiated in the early 20th 
Century- and the irrationalism of the imputative hermeneutics advocated by post-
struturalism- emerging as of 1960-, allocated the ontological questions to an apparent 
second-round domain. In any form, the inevitable grounding (conscious or –more 
commonly- unconsciously) of scientific or philosophical propositions under one of the two 
poles of the Ontology results in consequences not only abstract, but, on the contrary, also 
objectives. 
 As such, to apprehend the nuances of this dialectical, but dichotomous historical 
duel is to comprehend, consequently, not only the development of Geography, but of the 
human knowledge itself. 
 Assuming as a premise the Marxian ontology‟s fundamental postulate –that is, 
knowledge is a fact (being it historical, social and practical), we use as ontological principles 
of philosophical analysis the Dialectical Materialism, contained both in the Formal Logic, 
Dialectical Logic and Materialism and Empiriocriticism, from Lefebvre (1991) and Lenin (1946), 
respectively. Migrating to the field of Geography, we take the Critical Geography from 
Harvey (2000) and Quaini (1979) as common ground for the transposal of the Materialism 
and Idealism debate.  
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 It is demonstrated at the end how the Vulgar Materialism and Idealism‟s inherent 
Metaphysics, through its false dichotomies between Subject and Object, Spirit and Body 
and, specially, Nature and Man, shaped Geography to its intricate actual state. 
 Since the contact between Philosophy and Geography is compromised for a long 
time (QUAINI, 1979, p. 25-26), we judge the preliminary attempt to reestablish it as the 
relevancy of this work. 
  
METAPHYSICS AND IDEALISM 
 
 According to Lefebvre, the metaphysical „method‟ consists, briefly, in dividing, 
tearing what is whole and one, creating concepts artificially separated and displaced from 
Reality (1991, p. 53). The metaphysical Epistemology has as basis, therefore, the division of 
Subject and Object. Detaching the Self from Nature is to fall in the already warned mistake 
by Spinoza, that “there is no Empire inside an Empire” (SPINOZA, 2002, p. 551), with 
results that are grave not only inside the field of Geography, rupturing the metabolic 
relation between Being and the Natural, as in every ontological systems that derives from 
that basis. 
 The Metaphysics, in a nutshell: consists always in theory disconnected from 
practice; it is an individual doctrine, that disregards actual systems of mutual relation of 
parts, where the metaphysical is closed in itself, with its theory cyclical and isolated 
(complete or partially) in relation to Reality; it is anti-historical, ignoring both time and 
processuality of Man or Nature; and lastly, slows down or completely stops the progress of 
knowledge, since it sees attainable finalism in the process of human knowing, leaning: or to 
the supremacy of Thought in relation to the Natural, where Truth is only obtainable by 
beginning and ending in the Subject; or in the exact contrary, going to determinism, 
transforming us in automata subordinate to the physiological and natural environment, this 
being the majority pattern of 19th‟s Century Geography. The knowledge‟s naturalness, 
retroactive experience of Man with Nature is seen by the metaphysical as a problem.   
 Metaphysics is present in both sides of Philosophy‟s most prominent debate: be it 
in Idealism, or Materialism. However, the metaphysical thought, historically, had 
predominant exposition through idealist philosophical systems. Idealism, for Lefebvre, is 
defined as “the doctrines that elevate a part of the acquired knowledge to the absolute, 
making of such part an mysterious idea or thought that, according to them, existed before 
nature or real man” (1991, p. 53, emphasis added). 
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 As such, it‟s derived that all Idealism is, necessarily, metaphysical, since it always 
separate what is whole. Yet, the reciprocal is not true, given the existence of Metaphysical 
Materialism –seen in detail above-, that advocates the same rupture of Thought and Being 
but with inverted signals, as it infers the absolute submission of Thought to the naturalist 
physiology. 
 What explains Idealism‟s predominance as a philosophical current for almost two 
millennia is the social division of labor (LEFEBVRE, 1991, p.59). Occurring in the earliest 
of times, already in Ancient Greece and increasing ever since, the division led the Human 
Being, that naturally builds your knowledge (and yourself) by the constant interaction with 
the Natural, to have its epistemic leitmotif changed by the Intellectual‟s class (philosophers, 
mathematicians, etc.)- themselves a product of the division of labor. As such, with the 
creation of some social extracts focused on manual labor and others in the intellectual one, 
the absolute rupture of the ones who think with the concrete that surrounds them was a fertile 
soil to the hegemony of the idealist current since remote times, where the priority, as 
expected, gone to the Subject, and not the Object1-the last being seen with despise, as it was 
handled mostly by the socially inferior classes. Consequently, the common sense that Being 
existed exterior and independent of me –incorporated by the general population- is inverted, 
transformed in its exact opposite: the Being is subordinated to the Thought. 
 Therefore the idealist, in addition to his innate metaphysics, considers the spirit as 
the primordial element of Reality. His ecstasy, addiction and argumentative fundament 
consists in the “inversion of the real process of knowledge”2. Processual, dialectical and progressive 
by essence, knowledge is gradual, result of the constant interaction (and elevation) of Man 
in relation to Nature. But, in considering knowledge as previous to the concrete world, 
Idealism inverts then the real epistemic process: from gradual, to fixed; from dialectical, to 
formalized and stratified. 
 
THE IDEALISM AND ITS FORMS 
 
 “Nothing exists in understanding that does not derive from the senses, other than 
understanding itself, nise ipse intellectus3” (LEIBNIZ, 2010, p. 35). The Leibnizian maximum 
perfectly represents the Idealism from the 17-19th centuries. A great influence of Kant, 
Leibniz affirms, succinctly, that everything arises from experience with the world. But at 
                                                 
1 Such division had one of its first appearances in Ancient Greece, in the slavery system of the Polis. 
2 LEFEBVRE, 1991, p. 58. 
3 Except the intellect itself. 
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the same time, nothing arises: we see here the understanding elevated to the Absolute, in a 
form that it, completely removed from experience or Reality, transforms itself in the pillar 
of ontology‟s submission to Idea. 
 Kant, its successor, improved his system. Kantian Transcendental Idealism 
considers that scientific truths (i.e., knowledge derived from the interaction of thought and 
its logical instruments with the natural) had restricted range. Through concrete world‟s 
representations to our sensible intuition (our senses)- the phenomena- and only from them 
would be possible, by utilizing the Categories of Understanding, arrive to Knowledge 
(REALE and ANTISIERI, 2005, p. 352-355). However, given that sensible intuition is 
restrict to the concrete world, every concept unrelated to it is inapprehensible, being 
possible to exist or not. These would be the controversial “things-in-itself” (or noumenon), 
the boundary zone of our epistemic incursion (LEFEBVRE, 1991, p.220). If the division 
noumenon/phenomena is something intern to the material object, being only an 
epistemological division, or if it happens in a metaphysical level, where Nature‟s 
constitution would be only phenomenal, being, if real, the noumena apart from the 
Universe, it‟s a question of intense debate. 
 What matters to our analysis however is to stress out that, although Kant did 
considered certain progressive conception of knowledge, where, in refining human 
understanding (approximating it to the Transcendental Deduction), we could comprehend 
more and more the phenomena, his Ontology and Epistemology falls into the unavoidable 
errors of the idealist Metaphysics. Postulating, following Leibniz, that the Understanding is 
unrelated to experience, being something innate and incomprehensible to Man, there is the 
banal elevation of it to the category of Absolute (nise ipse intellectus), from where follows the 
subsequent subordination of the Ontology to the Subject, this being the active agent in 
relation to the passive Nature. In the epistemological field, the recurrent idealist‟s inaccuracy 
about the inversion of the process of knowledge occurs: The Truth about Reality and its 
internal logic would be majorly finished by the Science of his period (LEFEBVRE, 1991, p. 
93), with Newtonian Physics and Euclidian Mathematics being, for Kant, the perfect 
examples of final synthesis in the areas of Physics and Mathematics, respectively. 
Experience, in the other hand, would only be an appendix of knowledge, given that the 
basic notion of all Nature‟s structure (i.e., its laws) would already be initially present in the 
human mind, albeit in the form of a priori knowledge derived from Metaphysics. 
Experience‟s function would be then to elevate from a state of potentiality the innate 
knowledge mentioned above, putting it at clear sights. 
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 The conclusion is dual: knowledge, as a fact derived from the constant interaction 
between Man and Nature, is ignored, being allocated as something ultimately independent, 
displaced from Reality. As such, causality is replaced by tautology4, with the difference that 
in the Kantian system God as a final cause becomes occult5. Besides, the negation of time 
takes away the infinite historicity of knowing, allocating it to the artificial synchrony that 
knowledge has an end, being passible of eternal categorization after an final synthesis (see 
ENGELS, 2015, p. 68 and 118-119). 
 Not unexpectedly, the cast in stone epistemological premises of Transcendental 
Idealism collapsed by self-sabotage when, not even fifty years after the author‟s death, the 
„perfection‟ of Classical Mathematics and Newtonian Physics were undermined by both the 
discoveries of Riemann - that lead to the Non-Euclidian Geometry- and Plank and 
Einstein- culminating later in Quantum Mechanics and General Relativity. 
 In contrast, the conviction seen in the Kantian Epistemology, sometimes higher, 
sometimes smaller, in the efficiency of the instruments of thought to enhance the 
approximation to the Truth is, mostly, what differentiates - amongst idealists- objectives ones 
from the subjectives. 
 Accordingly, Objective Idealism is defined, for Lefebvre, as the philosophical 
currents that give certain value to our methods and instruments of knowledge, giving 
validity, although partial, to the knowledge derived from human understanding6. Kant, 
Leibniz, Hegel, Descartes and the vast majority of philosophers of the idealist tradition 
belong to this current. Subjective Idealism, conversely, is characterized by the total disbelief 
in the human capacity to attain Truth, having as motto that every „knowledge‟ is merely an 
artificial construct, specific subjectivism of the individual interpretation. 
 Classical example and maybe the most radical subjective idealist would be Berkeley. 
Denying completely the existence in itself of the sensible world, the philosopher‟s Idealism is 
the result of the most acute bestial division realized by Metaphysics. Far from just 
recognizing, - as the traditional metaphysicians- that Subject and Object are fundamentally 
opposite and irreconcilable, Berkeley completely denies the Object, inferring that every part of 
concrete Reality is a result of the mind, and only from it (LEFEBVRE, 1991, p. 246). In 
                                                 
4 In Logic, that which is true under any interpretation, an obviousness. 
5 Reintroduced, contradicting his Antinomies of Pure Reason, in the Critical of the Practice Reason under the 
format of the Categorical Imperative. 
6 LEFEBVRE, 1991, p. 54. 
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this way, matter and the world would be a mere simulacrum produced by our thoughts, 
with even the sensible existence of other humans being close to a delirium7. 
 As we will shall see soon, there is convergence, although contingent, between 
objective idealists and materialists concerning the “problem” of knowledge. 
 
OBJECTIVE IDEALISM AND ITS IMPORTANCE 
 
 Rule out something, completely or partially, only because its author belongs or not 
to the idealist current would be at the very least paradoxical in face of our attempt to 
approach Philosophy in a dialectical way. The sublation (Aufhebung) has as basis the 
objective, rational elimination of the contradictory and insufficient portion of the facts, 
incorporating, then, each and every benefit or accuracy belonging to a system of ideas. 
 Since „Materialism‟ isn‟t a synonym for Science or Truth, the contrary is valid as 
well to Idealism. Indeed, “actually, and very much on the contrary, the idealist “systems” 
were frequently much more rich, complex and filled with life content in comparison to the 
materialist doctrines. The most penetrating instruments of knowledge were forged by 
idealists, in the heart of idealist doctrines” (LEFEBVRE, 1991). 
 By way of example, it would be opportune to briefly cite a concrete case. Descartes, 
as a scientist, took a completely materialist posture, with invaluable discoveries in the fields 
of refraction, physiology, algebra and analytical geometry. As a philosopher, he inferred the 
basis of his Ontology in the substance theory, clearly dividing his res extensa (everything that 
has extension; the concrete) from the res cogitans (dimension of thought; Spirit). 
Metaphysical by essence, in allocating all of his scientific contribution to the theological 
figure of God, Descartes incorporates an unmistakably idealist posture. However, this 
doesn‟t change the scope of his contribution to Knowledge, much higher and relevant than, 
for instance, his most irresolute contemporary critics, such as the firmly materialist Pierre 
Gassendi. Although correct in every objection postulated against the Cartesian Dualism 
from the Meditations, he didn‟t achieve the same scientific relevancy as his rival. 
 Consequently, since Knowledge cannot stop developing even inside idealist systems, we 
just reaffirm the Hegel and Marx‟s maximum, where Man develops even through his 
alienation. Therefore, without never abandoning a critical perspective in relation to Idealism 
- falling as such in the error of eclecticism- the dialectical materialist approach in some way 
                                                 
7 There is a psychiatric picture called “Solipsism Syndrome”. In it, the patient, generally as a response to long 
periods of detach ent, feels that the external world is just a product of his own mind. It‟s clear the almost 
pathological level of extreme metaphysics.  
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rehabilitate it, transforming it from absolute falsity to relative falsity. Its content is then 
integrated by the junction between Objective Idealism and in-depth Materialism, 
overcoming, therefore, any unilaterality. 
 Lenin, in his Materialism and Empiriocriticism (influenced by the Anti-Dühring of 
Friedrich Engels), exposes in a clear way the principle of sublation in the ideas: 
 
Idealism, in the philosophical sense of the term, is foolishness only from the 
point of view of a crude, superficial, metaphysical Materialism. On the contrary, 
from the point of view of Materialism the disciplined by Dialectics, the 
philosophical Idealism is an unilateral growth, an excrescence, a superfetation, 
one of the traces or facets of knowledge, that ends up, by exaggeration, in the 
Absolute (…). Man‟s Knowledge isn‟t processed in a straight line, but in a curve 
one that perceptibly approximates the spiral (LENIN, 1946, Supplement to § 1 
from Chapter IV). 
 
 
MATERIALISM AND ITS FORMS 
 
 In theoretical opposition to the idealist current, Materialism considers Nature as a 
primordial element of human‟s knowledge and ontology. Not allocating this role to the 
Spirit (or other kind of Absolute), philosophers of the materialist current have as a basic 
premise the fact the Nature antecedes Man, and not the other way around - as it‟s seen in 
traditional Idealism. The only philosophical property that defines Materialism is the fact 
that matter exists outside our consciousness, before us and independent to us (whatever this 
existence may be). In this way, it‟s expected that Materialism as a pure current -
disassociated from any idealist vestige- be a rare fact until the advent of the scientific logic 
as such, in the 18th century. 
 Although impossible to trace a clear-cut division between both currents in our 
analysis of the History of Ideas (doing so would lead us to Vulgar Materialism, i.e., trying to 
force Reality‟s complexity inside some previous mold from abstract thought), we can 
clearly delimit gradations between both, in which past philosophers are majorly idealist or 
materialist. Moreover, demand that Democritus‟ Atomism in the 4th Century A.C., for 
instance, couldn‟t state the erratum that atoms are indivisible -like it did- in order to be 
classified as materialist is, at the bare minimum, utopian and not dialectical from our part: a 
fruit from vice the always at bay of anachronism. The classification of the Thought must be 
done, obviously, always in relation to the historical correspondent period. 
 The father and maybe oldest exponent of Materialism is, without any doubts, the 
above mentioned Democritus. Extremely influent over all thinkers with at least some 
interest in the objectivity of knowledge, the Greek thinker had as a core of his thought 
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Atomism, that allocated, in an unprecedented way, the causality of all Universe to 
something belonging to Nature: the indivisible -and independent from the Idea- Atom. 
This was the first and more influent trial of a materialist explanation of Ontology, i.e., of 
explaining he nature of Reality and Existence without appealing to Teleology 8. Far away 
from the obvious consequences of Atomism, Democritus‟ Thought, together with the 
subsequent and disciple Epicurus, was crucial in the process of elevation of Man in relation 
to Nature. 
 Final epistemic objective in the thought of Democritus, the causality (αἰτιολογία) 
would be by him discovered. It would become the basis of Materialism: vulgar, or 
dialectical. 
 
METAPHYSICAL MATERIALISM, MODERN MATERIALISM 
 
 Merely inverting the idealist poles of supremacy of Subject to Object, the vulgar or 
metaphysical materialism elevates neither the Spirit nor Thought to the Absolute category: 
it does it with the very Nature. Denying in its extreme any possibility of free-choice, this 
mechanical allocation of causality to the Historical Being had effect, in practice, apologetic 
to the Bourgeois Society of the 19th Century. Through countless distortions of the 
Darwinian theory of Evolution it tried -by the crude transposition of method from Natural 
Sciences- the transformation of Society (and consequently of Man) in an object ruled by 
exact laws, obtained through empirical inductivism and with predictability equal to an 
Newtonian physical body. Any practical possibility of changing Reality was denied, direct 
or indirectly. Partially opposing Idealism, the Vulgar Materialism incorporated at the end its 
Teleology. The Social Physicists praised Lamarck and his vulgar orthogenesis9, thinking 
that in doing so they perfectly followed Darwin‟s Theory. 
 Be it in Morgan, Tylor, Ritter, Comte, Freud, Durkheim or even partially in Hegel, 
the positivist determinism showed its face being the motto of the 19th Century. The brutal 
response to Idealism happened -as expected by the historical period- just through changing 
signals in the current divorce between Nature and Man. Replacing the divine teleology by 
                                                 
8 Explanation of nature in terms of purpose, directive principle or final cause. 
9 Hypothesis in which life would have a natural propensity to evolve in a linear way, to a determined end. This 
„biological teleology‟ guided metaphysical Materialism in the 19th Century. 
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the natural one, Vulgar Materialism kept intact the Metaphysics dominant in the last two 
centuries. From the Phenomenalism, into the Epiphenomenalism10:  
 
Vulgar materialism answers denying the “I”, the conscious, human activity; 
dragging detail findings to the Absolute (for example, the reflexes), it gets out of 
the vicious circle of consciousness, but to renounce to consciousness, that, in 
his opinion, is still a vicious circle!” (LEFEBVRE, 1991, p. 66). 
 
 Insufficient and filled with problems, Vulgar Materialism was a start. Recognizing 
the historicity of knowledge and the naturalness of Man (firmly denying his mystical-
theological origin), it, although apologetic to the Capitalist Social Order, was an utmost fact 
in contributing to the human processual apprehension of Reality. 
 Modern Materialism -or dialectical- surpasses the mechanicism exposed above, since 
it considers the vulgar opposition to Idealism as a mere duel between opposites internal to 
Metaphysics. It considers consciousness as real, objective, a reality that cannot be isolated from 
History, the organism and Nature, being it impossible to subordinate, by any absolute laws, 
to these characteristics. Inferring that Man is a product of Nature and at the same time 
different from it, dialectical materialism defines itself not by the superficial recognition of the 
mere existence of Mater, but by the anteriority of Being in relation to the Thought, fact 
which implies in the anteriority of Nature in relation to the Spirit, Body to Consciousness, 
of content to form. It overcomes Metaphysics, reconciling Nature and Man by a metabolic 
and indissoluble bond. The relations between the dialectical pairs are not a matter to the 
speculative Philosophy, but to scientific knowledge (LEFEBVRE, 1991, p. 87-88). 
 In his epistemological approach, Dialectical Materialism does not considers human 
perception as a perfect representation of Reality. On the contrary, there is recognition of 
the inconsistency between what is sensibly captured by thought, the form, and the essence 
of what is desired to learn, the content. But, in contrast from the idealist‟s proposition, this 
discrepancy doesn‟t imply in knowledge becoming intangible or allocated to some sort of 
transcendent realm. Knowledge is objective, a concrete fact. But the notion of full knowledge, 
absolute one, is indeed considered scholastic, since perpetuates under the aegis of the 
[false] Truth a portion of Reality, removing it from Time and ceasing any and every 
interaction of it with Nature. In doing so, we fall yet again in Metaphysics, where instantly 
the fraction of knowledge elevated transforms into falsity. 
                                                 
10 Philosophical vision that interprets thought, mind and human will as a causal consequence of physiological 
functions. Conscious would be irrelevant to human action, as we would act like automata following 
biochemical laws, without any chance of actively changing reality. 
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 Accordingly, knowledge can only be forged, and maintained, by the constant and 
incessant interaction with Reality, of Subject with Object, without never ceding to the 
stagnation of models or self-contained theories. Never finding Reality in its totality, it, 
however, crosses it always momentarily, with frequency proportional to the progress and 
scientific accumulation. It surges by the contradictory dispute between opposites, by trial 
and error, by the gradual, progressive and infinite accumulation of the “grains of truth”. Setting 
off from ignorance and arriving through the historical process to Science, the key to 
knowledge is the same of the Reality that contains it: the movement (LEFEBVRE, p. 81, 163, 
285). 
 In synthesis, dialectical materialist epistemology supposes: an Object, real matter 
progressively penetrated, and a Subject, being in which its perceptions in relation to the 
object correspond to it in a way more or less exact; that the Human Being is a subject-object, 
i.e., since he‟s as much mater as the Natural, he can analyze himself by equally scientific 
guidelines; Subject and Object, Thought and Matter, Spirit and Nature are at the same time 
distinct, however connect, fighting perpetually inside the Unity that they constitute. Infer 
about the relation of the pairs would be a job, as already said, to Science, and not 
speculation. 
 Finally, to clarify any uncertainties, a certain kind of symbolism can be useful. At a 
first look strange, Lenin‟s and Engels‟ idea that progress of knowledge never reaches Reality, 
being formed by the sum of grains of truth derived from relativity, approximation and even 
error, can be exemplified in a mathematical way. The dampened sinusoid‟s graph bellow is 
plotted from f , by the multiplication of f(x) by the damp factor .  
 
Source: LEFEBVRE, H. Formal Logic, Dialectical Logic. 1991, p. 285. 
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 The curve would represent the past thought that, by approximations, relative errors 
and contingent contradictions would approximate Reality, reaching it only in the infinite. 
However, the intersection points of the curve in the abscissa axis represent the grains of truth 
that the thought intercepts in its movement. They would be, in a certain way, part of the 
Truth. Equally noteworthy is that the margin of error in the inferences -represented by the 
distance of the curve in relation to the X axis- reduces proportionally to the extension of 
f(x). Therefore, with the passage of History, we tend to increasingly approximate Reality.  
 We have, by now, sufficient mastery over the historical duel intern to metaphysics 
between Idealism and Vulgar Materialism, as well of the position from Dialectical 
Materialism in relation to it. We can now analyze in what form this debate showed itself 
inside the core of the so-recent Geography, with all of its particularities. 
 
GEOGRAPHY AND PHILOSOPHY 
 
 Born inside German Idealism, Geography has an intimately close origin with 
philosophical thought. Inaugurated by Kant, going through Herder, Humboldt, Ritter, 
Hegel and Ratzel, all of Geography‟s basis showed up in the 19th Century and in the earlies 
20th. Regardless to say the philosophical relevancy of names like Kant and Hegel, it‟s 
worthy to notice that Humboldt and Herder were, before anything else, philosophers too. 
Geography‟s origin has, as essence, the polemical debate contingent to Objective Idealism 
between Kant‟s Empiricism and the Hegelian Rationalism. As such, it‟s at least curious the 
present-state relation (or the lack of it) between the field of Philosophy and Geography. 
 Almost inexistent, the interaction between both areas, when occurs, is hostile. In a 
reactive manner to the almost absolute indifference of the philosophers to Geography, the 
geographers do worse, not only reattributing the attitude, but as well affirming in clear words 
the uselessness of the philosophical reflection, too much “abstract” for the nuances of 
Reality: 
 
The majority of geographers theorize as little as possible and are pleased when 
saying, without any shame, that “Geography is a synthetic science” (…). 
Geographers doesn‟t hide their despise by the “abstract considerations” and 
transform it in a merit, declaring their preference by the “concrete” (LACOSTE 
apud QUAINI, 1979, p. 25).  
 
 Analyzing, therefore, the so called Crisis of Modern Geography -specially the 
appendices of the resulting “New” Geography, like the hegemonic Pragmatic Geography- 
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we come closer to the obvious conclusion that the problem‟s roots are deep. The lack of 
epistemological notion (without even touching the ontological one) is overwhelming, 
explaining, if not completely at least partially the distance and backwardness of Geography 
in relation to other Social and Natural Sciences. The poor mastery in the elaboration and 
use of the most basic logic-reflexive instruments explains why the geographical debate has 
for so much time just oscillated -like a pendulum- between Determinism and Possibilism. 
 We will try in the following pages elucidate, therefore, an initial paradigm to the 
comprehension of the Philosophy of Geography, anchoring ourselves in the already 
exposed categories of analysis of the philosophical thought worked by Lefebvre, Lenin and 
Engels. 
 
KANT AND HUMBOLDT: the Kantian school 
 
 Kant is considered the creator of Modern Geography. Not by chance, he was the 
first both to teach it as a discipline and to try to systemize it, being his course of Geography 
one of the most popular in the University of Königsberg. Differently from his Speculative 
Reason exposed in the Critique of Pure Reason, for Kant Geography would be part of the 
Practical Reason. Kantian geography doesn‟t exclude the human question. Seen as one of the 
two constituent parts of a whole, the knowledge of the world -Weltkenntis- was composed 
to Kant both by the Nature‟s knowledge (Geography, studying everything that was 
available to sensibility, i.e., Earth‟s surface) and the knowledge of Man (Anthropology). 
Initially the discipline of Anthropology was, therefore, an integral part of the Geography 
course. 
 The Metaphysics of Kantian Geography was acute. Far from being in equal level of 
relevancy, Nature would be subordinated to Men, in a way that his discipline of 
Anthropology would explain the questions internal to the Being, while Geography would 
analyze the exterior world. The subordination is seen in the clearly teleological argument of 
Kant, in which the cause itself of Nature‟s existence would be Men. The Human Being 
would be the end of Nature, and Nature would exist for Men (ELDEN, 2011, p. 6). The 
Space (seen as separated from Time, or History), being an a priori, would be studied by 
Reason only. Since Nature belongs and can only exist per se in Space, the final cause of 
every empirical analysis of nature or Man falls, inevitably, into the aprioristics instruments 
of thought from Man himself. The Study of Space by itself is not something seen as 
attainable by the empirical knowledge. Therefore, in an analogous way to the description of 
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his method above, the knowledge of Reality takes experience as a mere appendix, given 
that its epistemological fundament is something to the ultimate consequences unattainable 
by Epistemology itself: the human understanding. Besides, as it considered experience as 
necessary to flourish the already innate [in potentiality] a priori knowledge, when confronted 
to the other spectrum of German Idealism that we‟ll see shortly, the Hegelian, Kant 
approximates way more from the Empiricist field (undeniable influence of Hume) 
compared to the exacerbated Absolute Racionalism of the Historical-Method. 
 A posteriori -ergo-, Anthropology‟s and Geography‟s analysis would be done like any 
other science in the Kantian Philosophy. The trial of unifying knowledge -elevating it to the 
Universal Categorization- shows the ambitious, ahistorical and cosmopolitan Kantian 
project with the Weltkenntis: the appropriate geographical and anthropological knowledge 
would provide every necessary condition to the practical knowledge of the whole World 
(HARVEY, 2000, p. 3). 
 Going beyond, however, its theoretical content, we see the undeniable influence of 
Montesquieu‟s geographical determinism in his Course. Resisting the error of anachronism, 
is nonetheless notable the prejudice scope of his texts in relation to other people. 
Foreseeing Linear Evolutionism -having at least surpassed polygenism11-, the content of 
Kant‟s affirmations is exemplified, without the need to further explanations, in his Notes 
(the guide to his Geography‟s course):  
 
In hot climates the man matures more rapidly in every aspect, but they do not 
reach the perfection of the temperate zones. Humanity reaches its biggest 
perfection with the White Race. The Yellow Indians have, in a way, less talent. 
Negros are much more inferior, and some peoples of the Americas are much 
below them (KANT, 1999, apud HARVEY, 2000, p. 4). 
 
 Finally, not only the notion exposed above is contradictory with his philosophical 
cosmopolitanism. The deficient bridge between his theoretical thought and practical reason in 
Geography is seen as well in his methodological principles. Trying to elevate the field of 
Geography not only to Science, but as the Science of all Earth‟s Nature, his systematical 
apprehension method of the physical characteristics of Earth is lacking. Seeking as an end 
the discovery of general laws, Kant proposed that the study of the terrain, soil, fauna and 
flora should be done only in a regional manner. The inference about Laws would first be 
valid only locally. But Kant doesn‟t says clearly how to make the leap from the Particular to 
the Universal, even inquiring in a frustrated manner if the discovery of causality in a small 
                                                 
11 Pre-evolutionist conception that considered all the non-white human races as animals, displaced -and 
inferior- to the Homo Sapiens.  
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scale would be possible: “the organization of Nature have nothing of analogous to any 
causality known to us” (KANT, 1999 apud HARVEY, 2000, p. 5). 
 Kant‟s writings about Geography didn‟t have a late influence. Profound students of 
Kantian Philosophy, the Humboldt brothers had vestiges of the Transcendental Idealist 
method in almost all of their work. Alexander Von Humboldt, the youngest brother, 
undertook the most glorious and colossal trial of utilizing Kant‟s conception about the 
geographical knowledge. Through constant regional experimentation, searching for an 
absolute and integrated synthesis of understanding of Nature, he wrote his Kosmos (1845), 
an encyclopedic catalog of all knowledge collect in his voyages across the world as a 
Naturalist. His quantitative findings practically created biogeography, with his idea of long 
term geophysical measurement laying the basis of Meteorology and geomagnetical 
monitoring. 
 Humboldt managed to transcend and systemize in a notable manner the Kantian 
inferences about the study of Nature, these being chaotic and often conflicting. A true 
product of the Late Renaissance (2000, p.18), Alexander managed, through his passion and 
encyclopedism, to unify Humanism with Geography, reaching maybe even more closer to 
the cosmopolitanism than Kant himself. Obviously, Humboldt was not exempt from the 
historical eurocentrism at the time, period which, for the most part, proved itself to be the 
grave of his stillbirth Kosmos. Over the 19th Century, the partition of disciplines in 
Universities reached its peak. Given the necessity of rapidly meet the demand of States 
immersed in Imperialism, only the knowledge collected and utilized in administrative 
purposes, in either State or Industry, were accepted into institutionalization. Therefore, the 
visionary work of Humboldt was discarded before it was even completed, curiously buried 
by the same Education guidelines forged by his older brother Wilhelm, the creator of the 
University of Berlin. Geography abandons forcedly, then, its interdisciplinary, unifying and 
totalizing prototype project. 
 But, not only by historical fatalities was Humboldt‟s work buried. Assuming the 
Objective Idealism of Kant, Alexander accepted the premise of metaphysical separation 
between Time and Space. Thus, showing little to no interest by the dynamic of Reality, he 
affirmed without hesitation that the not solved mysteries of the development (Human or 
Natural) were not part of the empirical-scientific observation. Only Reality‟s the present 
state (synonymous of final) could be analyzed. Homologous error to the Kantian vulgate in 
the fields of Physics and Mathematics, the indifference towards processuality and Time was 
concealed by Darwin, with his Origin of Species. From then on -and by a long time as we will 
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see-, evolution and the notion of process gained precedency over form and pattern (2000, 
p. 19). 
 Lastly, the Kantian Method, represented by Kant and refined by Humboldt, stood 
limited to its ontological basis: the Transcendental Idealism. Its Metaphysics, clearly seen in 
the division of Reason and Experience, Nature and History, Subject and Object, Space and 
Time, transforms in pure mechanicism the Man and Environment relation, obfuscating 
Alexander‟s project of geographical encyclopedism. More a practical man than a theoretical 
one, Humboldt would see his antithesis in the equally German Ritter, with which he 
divides hitherto the founder of Geography position. 
 Therefore, the maximum addiction of the absolute synthesis of Reality -both by 
negation or vulgar incorporation of the process- took Geography sometimes to the “causal” 
geographical determinism, sometimes to the semi-theological. Teleonomy12 permeated the 
debate of 19th Century. With Hegel, Idealism achieved the incorporation of time in its 
geographical way of thinking, utilizing itself from the Ritterian Conception; however, little 
in fact changed from its ontological basis. 
  
RITTER, HEGEL AND THE HISTORICAL METHOD 
 
 Carl Ritter was a theoretical. An anachronistic vestige of German Romanticism, 
Ritter was before anything else a Philosopher and a Historian, having as natural habitat a 
University chair, and not the dangerous and uncomfortable expeditions across the New 
World. Not only in spirit, Ritter was opposed to Humboldt also in method. The initial 
explanation of this discrepancy is in his conception about Geography: far from the 
universalizing perspective of the Kantian Method, Ritter‟s the Comparative Method 
perceived the object of Geography as the description of regions. By the thorough gathering 
of details about the landscape (concept of which he came very close to define) -what he 
considered the indissoluble central element of the Geographical Science- the objective of 
his method was the precise categorization of Earth in regions with intrinsic sources of 
coherence. Such regions would form latter the more elevated degree of continents‟ 
categorization. 
 His Magnum Opus, “Die Erdkunde” (literal translation from German as “Geography”) 
or “The Comparative Method”, was a colossal work of more than twenty thousand pages, in 
which Ritter tried to describe and categorize all of the global terrain through traveler‟s 
                                                 
12 Teleology applied to live matter; search of finality in the biological field. 
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reports. Filled with a vulgar providentialism13, in it Man is considered as a “maximum 
work” of the “Creator”, being Earth merely His “theater of historical development” and 
the fauna and flora our teleological appendixes. What interests us, however, is the 
innovative approach in his description of landscape. Far from just topographical or 
physical, the landscape of a particular ambient is characterized by climate, vegetation, 
animals and, finally, the Man and his historical relation with the natural elements. Advocating 
that Geography should comprehend not only how Man influences the space where he lives, 
but, how he is influenced by it, Ritter is a pioneer in the historical analysis of regions. In 
doing so, his objective was to locate the period of its higher population development, as in 
it, he believed -and here with no doubts influenced by Linear Evolutionism- was where the 
most acute harmony between Culture and Nature occurred. Therefore, his Comparative 
Method not only would categorize the World, but study as well the History of the particular 
regions. In this way, it is by historicity that we observe the influence of the Comparative 
Method in the hegemonic philosopher of the 19th Century, beyond the point of opposition 
to Kant-Humboldt. 
 G. W. F. Hegel not only openly admired the Erdkunde, utilizing as well the 
topographical descriptions contained in it to fundament the way of expression of his 
Welkgeist, the “World‟s Spirit”. Synonym of “History” for Hegel, the “Weltgeist” would 
express its totality through the particular “Spirit of the Peoples”, the Volksgeist, that, 
without contact with each other, would only have the Natural as support to development. 
Thus, the interaction between Spirit and Nature not only makes itself as would be the History 
itself. Such relation between Environment and Man would be ruled by the laws of Dialectics. 
This Unity would imply in visible problems in relation to the liberty of the Human Will:  
 
Insofar as he is not free and is a natural element, Man affirms himself to be 
sensible- and the sensible is divided in two aspects, being the subjective 
naturalness and the exterior naturalness. That last is the geographical aspect, 
belonging to the exterior nature (…). What matters is not to know the soil as an 
extrinsic place, but the natural type of place that exactly coincides with the type 
and character of the people son to that soil (HEGEL, G. W. F. apud QUAINI, 
1979, p. 31). 
 
 Therefore, without any doubts a revolutionary advance to the processual 
apprehension of Reality, the shallow Hegelian Geography was not exempt of problems. 
Ultimately, his Philosophy of History, although reconciling Subject with History, had as 
pillar a latent geographical determinism since, depending on the inhabited region by the 
Volk, his character, History and technical elevation in relation to Nature would be almost 
                                                 
13 Idea that God is the true protagonist of History, being Man no more than His object of action. 
|Materialism, idealism and the onto-epistemological roots of Geography| 
 
|Mikhael Lemos Paiva| 
 InterEspaço         Grajaú/MA        v. 3, n. 9        p. 07-26        maio/ago. 2017 
 
Página 24 
an a priori, controllable only the abstraction of Idea. Curiously, on the other hand we see 
that the ideal climate to the development of the History‟s Spirit would be the tempered one, 
with the terrain identical to that of the Old World! The Weltgeist Dialectics transmutes itself 
in the ethnocentric history of the Ideal Society: The one of the Bourgeoisie. 
 The debate contingent to Objective Idealism results therefore in the specific 
oblivion of Kant and Humboldt. The Epistemology that was most able to align itself to the 
interests of the State was the one that gained hegemony in the Institutions. Although still 
ontologically restrict to the irreparable Absolute, the Historic Method in Geography 
showed itself as the system of ideas most fit -by a short period of time- to the historical 
necessities of the Capital. Still necessary to the civilizing justification for the widening of 
markets, now the Imperialist expansion faced the necessity of objective explanation of Reality 
-something that Hegel‟s Transcendental Dialectics hadn‟t a good proficiency, given its 
philosophical roots. 
 The answer would arrive not only in another method, but by other ontology. The 
struggle by the ideological supremacy in Geography would now be taken off Idealism, 
remaining, on the other hand, still in the safe Metaphysics. 
 
METAPHYSICAL MATERIALISM: between Possibilism and Determinism 
 
 The predominance of Metaphysical Materialism in Geography begins with Ratzel, 
surviving to the Renovation of Geography and still finding shelter today under the 
Pragmatic Geography. Of extensive particularities to this work, the process above can be 
synthesized in the „Renovation‟ not of Geography, but of Positivism. Going through the 
orthogenetic vulgate of the Ratzelian “Organic State” to the geographical Synchronic 
Possibilism of La Blache, finally peaking in the Pragmatic Neopositivism, Metaphysics 
maintains itself as the ontological basis of Geography. 
 Certainly an advance, the rupture with Idealism occurred partially, being completed 
only by the minority Critical Geography. The separation between Man and Environment is 
not only catastrophic, but necessary to the Capitalist fetishism, that sees in Nature nor 
History, nor Dialectics: only passive Object. This results in the transformation of 
Geography as a mere political-economic instrument of a class, a law just brought up-to-date 
in by “Quantitative Revolution” in the Modern World. The bloody and historical 
„methodological‟ debates of Geography prove themselves as majorly fruitless, since they 
express the complete misunderstanding of the ontological root of the problem:  
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Geography still reveals to this date a dualist soul: it oscillates, continues to 
oscillate between Determinism and Possibilism, Naturalism and Idealist 
Historicism, between an materialist causality and indeterminate Finalism (…) 
i.e., from one side, there is a tendency to consider Reality as only the necessity 
or the material causality, from the other, Reality is considered as only Finalism 
or Liberty of the Human Action. These are two solutions that doesn‟t solve the 
antinomy, but that perpetuate it, because it‟s normal that Idealism brings with 
itself (even in its context) its opposite (vulgar materialism), as well as 






 As exposed through this work, Geography was not able to sublate the metaphysical 
arbitrariness of its birth. However before anything else, evading the imobilism of progress‟ 
negation -that being the post-Structuralist motto-, it‟s necessary to recognize the advance of 
the geographical thought. Never pending to the solipsist subjectivism, it managed to 
surpass the vulgar Teleology of Idealism and the Lamarckian Orthogenesis, actually in the 
end resulting in an important counter-hegemonic movement synthetized by Critical 
Geography.  
 Nevertheless, the result of the rupture between Man and Nature crystalized in a 
mere methodological debate contingent to Metaphysics. From Kantianism to Ritter and 
Hegel, Ratzel to La Blache, Quantitative Geography to Systemic, all the great debates of the 
hegemonic geographical thought oscillated only between Empiricism and Rationalism. The 
so called Quantitative Revolution, instead of answering in a resounding way to the ontological 
crisis of Geography, just upgraded Comte to the XX Century, introducing Neopositivism 
to the field. 
 The reconciliation between Man and Nature- neutralizing at last the false 
opposition between Subject and Object- is the central task to the full advance of Science. 
Such is the importance, if not total, at least partial of Modern Materialism, since it allocates 
Nature as the only totality and explains the World from the World itself. Geography, given 
its ambitious object of studies, has and will have a fundamental role in the infinite, but 
objective human apprehension of Reality, needing to, beforehand, bury definitely -and finally- 
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